▪️ Nijeesh N, Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management.
New Delhi: A series of clashes, protests and attacks involving Sikh organisations, farmer groups and political formations in August have brought Punjab’s fragmented Panthic politics into sharper focus ahead of the 2027 Assembly elections.
The latest flashpoint came on August 13 near Ambala Cantonment in Haryana, where a protest over an alleged assault on International Anti-Khalistani Terrorist Front (IAKTF) leader Gursimran Singh Mand turned violent. Nine police personnel, including a DSP whose finger was severed, and several protesters were injured. Police used tear gas and baton charges after demonstrators blocked National Highway 44 for nearly six hours.
The protesters, including members of the Haryana Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee (HSGMC), sections of the Bharatiya Kisan Union and groups associated with Akali Dal-Waris Punjab De, demanded the release of two Sikh youths arrested over the August 7 incident and withdrawal of cases against them. Police alleged that some protesters carrying swords, spears and battle-axes attacked personnel and indulged in stone-pelting.
Mand alleged that he and his son were attacked because of his anti-Khalistan stance and claimed protesters demanded the release of jailed MP Amritpal Singh. The HSGMC, however, alleged that Mand’s vehicle was driven recklessly through a religious congregation and injured a devotee.
The confrontation was followed by protests in Chandigarh on August 15, when Qaumi Insaf Morcha activists clashed with police while demanding parole for Jagtar Singh Hawara and the release of other Bandi Singhs. Police used water cannons and tear gas after protesters attempted to breach barricades with a tractor. Former MP Simranjit Singh Mann was detained, while the Morcha later announced a Punjab-wide bandh.
The Bandi Singh issue has a longstanding constituency centred on sentence completion, equal treatment and historical grievances. Punjab chief minister Bhagwant Mann’s reported request for 10 days’ parole for Hawara on humanitarian grounds has also brought the issue into mainstream political discourse.
Meanwhile, SAD president and former Punjab deputy chief minister Sukhbir Singh Badal was allegedly attacked with a kirpan at a gurdwara in Nanded on August 13. Police have so far found no clear evidence of an organised conspiracy. The incident followed a 2024 shooting attempt on Badal outside the Golden Temple.
Former Akal Takht Jathedar Giani Raghbir Singh also reported that his security vehicle was fired upon outside his Amritsar residence. A .32-bore shell and bullet mark were reportedly found, while the identity and motive of the shooter remain unknown.
The incidents illustrate how local disputes can quickly acquire wider religious and political dimensions. The Ambala confrontation, in particular, moved from a local dispute to arrests, a highway blockade and clashes with police before becoming part of a broader Sikh political controversy.
The mobilisation has also drawn support from farmer organisations and religious networks. HSGMC president Jagdish Singh Jhinda announced a larger congregation at Pipli Grain Market on August 25, inviting Sikhs from across the country. Such networks can facilitate rapid mobilisation across villages, gurdwaras and highways.
At the same time, the weakening of the Shiromani Akali Dal has created space for newer formations. Akali Dal-Waris Punjab De, associated with jailed MP Amritpal Singh, is seeking to expand its Panthic appeal. Amritpal’s 2024 Lok Sabha victory from Khadoor Sahib and Sarabjit Singh Khalsa’s victory from Faridkot demonstrated the electoral reach of Sikh-identity politics.
Sacrilege also remains a major political fault line. The 2015 Bargari sacrilege and subsequent Behbal Kalan police firing continue to influence political discourse and the SAD’s traditional Panthic credibility. The legacy of the 1984 anti-Sikh violence and unresolved grievances surrounding Sikh prisoners further adds to the political sensitivity.
With the AAP, Congress, SAD, BJP and emerging Akali formations competing for influence among Sikh voters, religious institutions and farmer organisations are likely to remain important mobilisation centres.
Ahead of the 2027 election, potential flashpoints could include sacrilege, prisoner-release demands, gurdwara management, police action and agrarian grievances. The key challenge for the authorities will be to distinguish legitimate political and religious mobilisation from organised violence, while ensuring that unresolved grievances do not become vehicles for radical mobilisation.
